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ABSTRACT
Research suggests a Haunted People Syndrome (HP-S) is defined by
the recurrent perception of anomalous subjective and objective
events. Occurrences are traditionally attributed to supernatural
agencies, but we argue that such interpretations have morphed
into themes of “surveillance and stalking” in group-stalking
reports. We tested a series of related hypotheses by re-analyzing
survey data from the 2015 Sheridan and James study to explore
statistical patterns in “delusional” group-stalking accounts (N=128)
versus“non-delusional” (control) accounts of lone-culprit stalking
(N=128). As expected, we found that (i) account types had
different Rasch hierachies, (ii) the Rasch hierarchy of group-
stalking experiences showed a robust unidimensional model, and
(iii) this group-stalking hierarchy correlated significantly with
spontanous “ghost“ experiences. However, we found no clear
evidence for “event clustering” that might signify contagious
processes in symptom perception. Findings support the viability
of the HP-S construct and the idea that experiences of group-
stalking and haunts share common sources.
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Reported interactions with folklore-type and “otherworldly” entities including angels,
demons, gods, apparitions, extra-terrestrials, shamanic spirit guides, elves, fairies, polterge-
ists, and Men in Black (MIBs) have featured heavily in human culture throughout history.
These “entity encounter experiences” (or simply “encounter experiences”) can occur spon-
taneously (Evans, 1987; Suedfeld & Mocellin, 1987; Tyrrell, 1953/2010) or apparently on-
demand via techniques like mirror-gazing (Caputo, 2010; Radin & Rebman, 1996), sitter
groups or séance-type sessions (Laythe et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2010), transcerebral mag-
netic field stimulation (Persinger et al., 2000; St-Pierre & Persinger, 2006), meditative or
trance states (Persinger, 1992; Tributsch, 2018), or the use of psychedelics (Winkelman,
2018).
Comparative literature (Evans, 1984, 1986, 1987, 2001; Hufford, 1982, 2001; Winkelman,
2018) and statistical studies (Houran, 2000; Houran & Lange, 2001; Pekala et al., 1995) indi-
cate that outwardly disparate encounter experiences often share similar narrative themes
and structures. There are also commonalities in the perceptual-personality profiles of the
experients (e.g., Houran, Kumar et al., 2002; Kumar & Pekala, 2001; Laythe et al., 2018; Parra,
2018). These patterns arguably suggest a “family tree” of anomalies that is rooted in a core
process and biological structure, but which can change its appearance in accordance with
the sociocultural or situational context in which it manifests.
Group-stalking as encounter experiences
O’Keeffe et al. (2019; cf. Sheridan, 2019; Ventola et al., 2019, p. 164) speculated that con-
temporary accounts of putative “group-stalking” could be a new or novel embodiment of
encounter experiences. “Group (or gang)-stalking” refers to victims who state that they are
being mysteriously targeted by coordinated groups of people (Paullet et al., 2009). Inter-
estingly, O’Keeffe et al. (2019) found that the phenomenology of an illustrative and
popular case of group-stalking markedly paralleled the contents and defining patterns
of ghostly episodes. These common features of ghost experiences and group stalking
include the type, frequency, and progression of anomalous experiences, inherent
themes of persecution, and occasional incidences of gaslighting of witnesses and so-
called “street theater” (i.e., allegations of scripted events that aim to harass and stress
targeted individuals). The religio-cultural themes of “spirits, spooks, and the supernatural”
traditionally attributed to certain types of anomalous experiences might therefore be evol-
ving in some select instances to “satellites, surveillance, and stalking” in the present tech-
era. Our conjecture is consistent with the contextual mediation of contents observed for
various encounter experiences (Captuo, 2014; Evans, 2001; Houran, 2000).
Seminal research by Sheridan and James (2015) suggests that the phenomenology of
group-stalking differs from reported stalking cases involving lone-culprits and is argu-
ably delusional in nature due to certain factors. First, the group-stalking percipients in
their study exhibited depression and PTSD symptomology, as well as social and occu-
pational difficulties. Both disorders are known for delusional or psychotic features if
the disorders are sufficiently severe (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
More broadly, group-stalking is allegedly the work of a network acting in concert, but
it is generally not possible for alleged victims to identify one lead person involved in car-
rying out the activities. Also, it is characteristic that victims are generally unable to
provide any evidence as to who is behind the group-stalking, albeit they may attribute
its origins to a specific source (e.g., an ex-partner or covert government agency). Conver-
sely, in conventional stalking cases the offender is usually known to the victim. Illustra-
tively, Spitzberg and Cupach’s (2007) meta-analysis of 175 studies of stalking specifically
found that 80% of victims knew the identify of their stalker.
O’Keeffe et al. (2019) proposed the moniker Haunted People Syndrome (HP-S) to
describe encounter experiences that specifically manifest recurrently to the same percipi-
ents. The term syndrome denotes a set of signs and symptoms that occur together to
characterise a particular abnormality or condition (British Medical Association, 2018),
and considerable evidence supports this depiction here. For example, Lange and Houran’s
(1998, 1999, 2001) structural equation model, with later nonlinear extensions (Lange &
Houran, 2000), accounted for “ghostly episodes” in terms of the same, or similar, atten-
tional or perceptual mechanisms (e.g., expectancy-suggestion effects and psychological
contagion) likely operating in cases of mass hysteria or psychogenic illness (e.g., Boss,
1997; Chen et al., 2003; Colligan et al., 1982; Wessely, 1987, 2000).
Similarities in their respective phenomenologies are readily apparent, as both involve
ambiguous stimulants that often trigger a sudden onset and cessation of dramatic signs
or symptoms— psychological (or subjective, S) or physical (or objective, O) in nature—pre-
dominantly in young females, and during times of psychosocial stress or physiological
arousal (cf. Boss, 1997; Lange & Houran, 2001). These “subjective” or private experiences
include sensed presences, apparitions, contact or communication with unspecified super-
natural agencies, possession by outside forces, and seeing elves and other types of “little
people” (akin to Lilliputian hallucinations). “Objective” experiences refer to the perception
of “tangible or externalized” anomalies, such as unexplained and localised sounds, electri-
cal disturbances, apparent object movements, temperature changes, as well as vestibular
alternations or other unusual affective or physiological complaints.
We should note here that percipients of ghostly episodes also tend to score higher on
transliminality and similar measures of thin or permeable mental boundaries (e.g., Houran,
Kumar et al., 2002; Jawer, 2006; Laythe et al., 2018; Parra, 2018). This latter finding implies a
heightened susceptibility to high-arousal or “dis-ease” states (Evans et al., 2019; Ventola
et al., 2019). It further seems that factors like transliminality can capitalise on humankind’s
potential biological basis or genetic predisposition for encounter experiences, and anom-
alous experiences in general (McClenon, 2004, 2012; Winkelman, 2004, 2018). Moreover,
ghostly episodes (and related encounter experiences) and psychogenic illness both
involve apparent psychological contagion, or the instigation of successive (episodic) per-
ceptions or experiences due to priming effects or demand characteristics within individ-
uals or groups (Houran & Lange, 1996; Laythe et al., 2017; O’Keeffe & Parsons, 2010).
Finally, Rasch (1960/1980) scaling analyses demonstrate that discrete S/O perceptions
that define ghostly encounters and related encounter experiences can be modelled as a
probabilistic and unidimensional hierarchy (cf. Table 1, left hand column) (Houran et al.,
2019; Houran & Lange, 2001). This means that these anomalous experiences have a gen-
erally structured and predictable phenomenology, although specific aspects can shift
depending on the attending circumstances. These include whether the experience is spon-
taneous (i.e., reportedly sincere and unprimed) versus based in priming (e.g., expecting to
have an encounter); a consequence of lifestyle (e.g., active member of a paranormal associ-
ation); a result of fantasy (e.g., engaged in an imaginative involvement exercise); or illicit
(deliberately fabricated narrative) conditions (Houran et al., 2019). Table 1 illustrates that
the themes and discrete experiences in group-stalking accounts can be interpreted as
resembling a subset of those typically reported in ghostly episodes.
Taken together, the HP-S model sides with anomalistic psychology to posit that ghostly
episodes and other encounter experiences fundamentally equate to delusion-like idea-
tions, albeit not necessarily pathological. The affective or perceptual aspects of these idea-
tions are facilitated by percipients’ transliminality, which suggests that the contents derive,
in part, from hypersensitivities to and amalgams of internal and external stimuli (Evans
et al., 2019; Laythe et al., 2018). These contents are then compounded by the tendency
Table 1. Group-stalking experiences mapped to the corresponding themes from the “Haunted People”
Rasch Hierarchy (Houran et al., 2019).
Spontaneous haunt experiences Group-Stalking experiences
I had a sense of déjà vu, like something was vaguely familiar to me about my thoughts,
feelings, or surroundings.





I heard mysterious “mechanical” or non-descript noises, such as tapping, knocking,
rattling, banging, crashing, footsteps or the sound of opening/closing doors or drawers.
I felt a mysterious area of cold.
I felt a breeze or a rush of wind or air, like something invisible was moving near me.
I saw with my naked eye a non-descript visual image, like fog, shadow or unusual light.
I heard mysterious sounds that could be recognised or identified, such as ghostly voices
or music (with or without singing).
. Lies spread about victim*
Electrical or mechanical appliances or equipment functioned improperly or not at all,
including flickering lights, power surges or batteries “going dead” in electronic devices
(e.g., camera, phone, etc.).
. Unsolicited telephone calls,
. Unsolicited text messages,
. Unsolicited emails
I had a negative feeling for no obvious reason, like anger, sadness, panic, or danger.
I was mysteriously touched in a non-threatening manner, like a tap, touch or light
pressure on my body.
I saw with my naked eye an “obvious” ghost or apparition – a misty or translucent image
with a human form.
I saw with my naked eye an “un-obvious” ghost or apparition – a human form that looked




I felt odd sensations in my body, such as dizziness, tingling, electrical shock, or nausea
(sick in my stomach).
I experienced objects disappear or reappear around me. . Left unwanted items,
. Unsolicited letters
Pictures from my camera or mobile device captured unusual images, shapes, distortions
or effects.
I smelled a mysterious odour that was pleasant.
I communicated with the dead or other outside force.
I saw objects moving on their own across a surface or falling.
I had a positive feeling for no obvious reason, like happiness, love, joy, or peace.
I heard on an audio recorder mysterious “mechanical” or non-descript noises, such as
tapping, knocking, rattling, banging, crashing, footsteps or the sound of opening/
closing doors or drawers.
I heard on an audio recorder mysterious sounds that could be recognised or identified,
such as ghostly voices or music (with or without singing).
I smelled a mysterious odour that was unpleasant.
I was mysteriously touched in a threatening manner, such as a cut, bite, scratch, shove,
burn or strong pressure on my body.
. Physically assaulted,
. Victim’s pet abused
I saw objects breaking (or discovered them broken), like shattered or cracked glass,
mirrors or housewares.
. Home broken into,
. Home vandalised,
. Car vandalised
I saw objects flying or floating in midair.
I felt a mysterious area of heat.
I felt guided, controlled or possessed by an outside force.
(Continued )
of some percipients to adopt explanations that are implausible, even esoteric or unortho-
dox, due to improper or biased consideration of evidence (see e.g., Garety & Freeman,
1999; Houran & Lange, 2004; Houran & Williams, 1998; Irwin, 2009; Irwin et al., 2012;
Prike et al., 2018; Ross et al., 2017; van Elk, 2015).
The present study
This paper extends our foundational work on the hypothesised concept of HP-S (O’Keeffe
et al., 2019) by re-examining Sheridan and James (2015) seminal survey data on “delu-
sional” group-stalking accounts compared to “non-delusional” stalking reports involving
lone-culprits. We will explore whether there are significant differences between the phe-
nomenology of these two groups, as well as determine if patterns of the “delusional”
group-stalking group conceptually replicate key findings from Rasch models of the
“signs and symptoms” reported by witnesses in “ghostly episodes” (Houran et al., 2019).
In this way, we aim to clarify whether group-stalking is an incarnation of the hypothesised
broader construct of HP-S. Based on earlier research, (Houran et al., 2019; Houran & Lange,
2001; Houran, Wiseman et al., 2002) three main hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 1: Sheridan and James (2015) identified “delusional vs. non-delusional” respondents. We
hypothesize that these two groups will show different hierarchies of signs and symptoms, and this
will cause the two groups to have different Rasch hierarchies.
Hypothesis 1A. We regard group-stalking accounts as direct constructions and hence delusional
respondents would seem to be actively initiating or controlling the narrative that their environments
contain interconnected and coordinated sets of threats. Accordingly, delusional respondents make
no substantive distinction between subjective and objective (S/O) events or symptoms. By contrast,
non-delusional stalking accounts can be viewed as indirect constructions, since these respondents
are not in control of circumstances but rather are reacting to the independent actions of actual cul-
prits. Thus, the signs and symptoms of their group-stalking reports form an unstructured Rasch hier-
archy in which subjective and objective events are inter-mixed in no particular fashion.
Hypothesis 1B: Not only does group membership (Delusional vs. Non-Delusional) likely introduce
hierarchy shifts, but such shifts are expected to be sufficiently powerful and systematic for
predict the respective group membership. As in earlier research (Houran et al., 2019; Lange et al.,
2015) we will test this hypothesis by applying machine learning techniques to the Rasch residuals
of the corresponding questionnaire items.
Hypothesis 2: For delusional respondents, the Rasch hierarchy of signs and symptoms will most
closely align to the Rasch model of spontaneous “ghostly episodes” from Houran et al. (2019).
Table 1. Continued.
Spontaneous haunt experiences Group-Stalking experiences
Plumbing equipment or systems (faucets, disposal, toilet) functioned improperly or not at
all.
I saw beings of divine or evil origin, such as angels or demons.
I had a mysterious taste in my mouth.
I saw folklore-type beings that were not human, such as elves, fairies, or other types of
“little people.”
Fires have started mysteriously.
*These group-stalking experiences might not prima facie appear similar to the referenced haunt experiences, but our
review of many case descriptions does support such correspondences in some instances.
Hypothesis 3: The Rasch hierarchy of signs and symptoms for delusional respondents will show
smaller variation across item locations than observed for non-delusional respondents, since “cluster-
ing” effects are consistent with the notion of “event flurries” that suggest possible perceptual biases
or psychological contagion effects (Houran et al., 2019; Jones & Jones, 1994).
Method
Dataset
Data derive from the Sheridan and James (2015) previously published survey (N = 256) of
two groups: “Delusional” respondents (i.e., self-reported group-stalking, N = 128, 75.8%
female; Mage = 45.6 yrs, SD = 12.5) and a randomly-selected comparison sample of “Non-
Delusional” respondents (i.e., self-reported lone-stalking, N = 128, 77.3% female; Mage =
38.5, SD = 10.9). We refer readers to Sheridan and James’ original paper for full details
on their samples and methods (pp. 4-7). Since their research design was a comparison
of the characteristics of those reporting group-stalking with those reporting stalking by
individuals, no matching of the samples on any parameters was undertaken, as this
risked detracting from the identification of group characteristics.
Rasch scaling
A unidimensional Rasch scaling framework starts from the assumption that the “tendency
to observe events that are construed as anomalous or unusual” is a “single latent trait.”
Respondents’ answers are characterised probabilistically by two sets of parameters: Di,
the trait level implied by question i, also called the item “difficulty,” i.e., the extent to
which answering affirmatively requires a particular position along the latent Rasch dimen-
sion, and (2) Tj, the trait level of the person answering the questions. Together, these par-




1− Pij = Tj–Di ,
where Pij represents the probability that respondent j reports observing event i. Note
that T and D, are expressed in the same metric, i.e., the log-odds (or logits) as
defined by the left side of Equation 1. Note that D increases with greater difficulty,
e.g., for items m and n with Dm < Dn experience m is reported more often than is experi-
ence n regardless of respondents’ trait levels T. Therefore, smaller logit values indicate
items that are more frequently or easily endorsed (i.e., “over-reported”), whereas
higher logit values indicate items that are endorsed relatively rarely or with more
difficulty (“under-reported”).
The D and T parameters in Equation 1 were estimated using Linacre’s (2018a, 2018b)
Winsteps and Facets software, respectively. The latter allows other factors (e.g., sex) to
be included in Equation 1 to assess their impact, either as main effects (men vs
women), or as interaction effects. Interactions involving the Dj, are of particular interest
as their existence indicates that items’ difficulties vary across sub-groups, thus producing
group-specific hierarchies. In the present research we wish to contrast the hierarchies for
Delusional versus Non-Delusional respondents. The Rasch software also computes items’
fit to the Rasch model. It does via item Outfit values, whose theoretically optimal value is 1
— but fluctuations within the .7–1.4 range are generally deemed acceptable (Linacre,
2018a).
Results
Table 2 summarises the results of Rasch scaling all respondents simultaneously on the left
(“Combined Sample”) and those separately for each group (“Sub-Groups”) on the right. We
discuss the columns of this Table separately as they pertain to our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
This hypothesis that Delusional vs. Non-Delusional groups will show different hierarchies
of signs and symptoms and consequently different Rasch hierarchies, received strong
support. Figure 1 shows the relation between the item locations obtained in the Non-Delu-
sional and Delusional groups plotted along the X and Y axis, respectively. In support of our
prediction, the points do not fall along the line Y = X, as would occur if items’ locations
were similar for the two groups. Instead, we find an erratic pattern resulting in a relatively
low (r = .61 correlation in contexts where correlations around .95 are common in the
absence of systematic item shifts (see, e.g., Lange, 2017).
While the preceding implies that the two groups are fundamentally more dissimilar
than similar, it is instructive to look at those items that deviate significantly from the
line Y = X. In Table 2 the bold-face entries in the Di columns for Non-Delusional and Delu-
sional respondents indicate that items’ locations in these two groups show statistically sig-
nificant differences (p < .01). In particular, Items 2 (“being followed”) and 3 (“spied on”) are
lower in the hierarchy of respondents deemed Delusional vs. Non-Delusional, i.e., these
two events are over-reported by Delusional respondents, or, equivalently, they are






3 Spied on −2.06 1.07 −1.30 .94
2 Followed −1.94 .70 −.39 .90
4 Lies spread −1.53 .90 −1.13 .79
7 Unsolicited calls −.67 1.01 −1.40 1.00
1 Secretly photographed −.28 1.18 .12 1.05
12 Home break-in .07 .83 .68 .77
14 Car vandalism .12 .82 .72 .92
9 Unsolicited items .26 .85 -.26 .83
6 Unsolicited letters .45 1.76 -.59 1.14
13 Home vandalism .45 .70 .94 .61
15 Property vandalism .50 .68 .79 .67
11 Pet abuse .86 .96 .98 .96
5 Unsolicited emails .97 1.62 -.46 1.41
8 Unsolicited texts 1.21 1.64 -.31 1.27
10 Physical assault 1.62 .87 1.02 .91
16 Other −.02 1.42 .60 1.64
aDelusional vs. Non-Delusional groups have different item locations for bolded items (p<.05).
bOutfit statistic over 1.4 for bolded items.
under-reported by Non-Delusional respondents. By contrast, Items 5 (“unsolicited emails”),
6 (“unsolicited letters”), 8 (“unsolicited texts”) and 10 (“physical attacks”) have significantly
lower logit values in the Non-Delusional group, i.e., legitimate stalking victims over-report
these “physical” events, whereas Delusional respondents under-report them. Thus, Delu-
sional respondents seemingly cast their narratives in more subjective, and arguably
more difficult to verify, experiences. On the other hand, Non-Delusional respondents
emphasise objective (or verifiable) experiences or features.
Hypothesis 1A
We created separate training and validation samples with 60% and 40% of the cases,
respectively, and we used the Rasch residuals of respondents’ observations as predictors
of group membership (Delusional vs. Non-Delusional). Table 3 shows the results of four
predictive approaches (Decision Trees, Linear Discriminant Analyses, Support Vector
Machines, and Logistic Regression) to differentiate the two respondent types, and it can
be seen that the overall percent correct across the four approaches is highly similar,
ranging from 63.6% to 67.4% for Logistic Regression and Decision Trees, respectively.
We thus conclude that Hypothesis 1A received strong support.
Figure 1. Item locations for Delusional vs. Non-Delusional groups.
The Confusion Matrix in Table 4 shows the percentages of correct classifications in the
Non-Delusional and Delusional samples, respectively, when a Decision Tree is used. Con-
sistent with the high percentage of correct decisions a statistically significant association
obtains (χ2(1, N = 132) = 13.72, p < .001).
Hypothesis 1B
Although the preceding showed that the Delusional and Non-Delusional item hierarchies
differ greatly, they are stable within each of these groups and the two hierarchies are as
predicted with respect to their S/O contents. Table 2 lists the items according to their
locations in the Delusional group with the lowest Di values first (i.e., the “easier to
endorse” items). The hierarchy for the Delusional group seems bifurcated by logit
values into Subjective experiences that define the earliest and most commonly types of
reported anomalies, whereas Objective events come later and constitute comparatively
rarer aspects of these accounts. By contrast, the non-delusional group shows an S/O
mixture in the lower/beginning part of the Rasch hierarchy and later in the hierarchy
encompasses a consistent array of (relatively rarer) O events.
Hypothesis 2
We predicted that the S/O phenomenology of the Delusional group would best match that
of “spontaneous” (sincere and unprimed) haunt narratives in Houran et al. (2019), as
opposed to control accounts from priming, lifestyle, fantasy, or illicit conditions. We
made these comparisons by calculating Pearson product moment correlations between
the logit values (i.e., item locations in the Rasch hierarchies) of S/O themes in accounts
of group-stalking and those in ghostly episodes (cf. O’Keeffe et al., 2019). Accordingly,
the higher and positive the correlation, the stronger the apparent alignment between
the item locations (and hence hierarchical structure) of the anomalous experiences
between the paired narratives.
Based on correspondences in themes made by O’Keeffe et al. (2019), Table 5 shows that
the hierarchical structures of S/O themes in the control narratives had almost entirely near-
Table 3. Percentage of correct predictions.
Method % Correct
Decision tree 67.4
Linear discriminant analysis 67.4
Support vector machine 66.7
Logistic regression 63.6






% correct 71.6 63.6
% improvement over baseline 11.8 3.8
zero associations with the group-stalking phenomenology. Strikingly, there was a moder-
ately-strong inverse correlation between the S/O phenomenology of group-stalking
accounts and that of “illicit” (i.e., deliberately deceitful) haunt narratives. This suggests
that Sheridan and James (2015) collection of group-stalking accounts was not deliberately
falsified. It also fits with the known characteristics of group-stalking, including its negative
impacts on those who report it (Sheridan & James, 2015). Indeed, some people who
believed themselves to be group-stalked have retaliated against those they perceived
to be targeting them and sometimes with fatal consequences (see Sarteschi, 2018).
Most importantly, Table 5 reveals a moderately-strong positive correlation (and thus
putative alignment) between the Rasch hierarchies of S/O themes in group-stalking
accounts and “spontaneous” ghostly episodes. This agrees with the idea that these two
types of anomalous episodes reflect a common experience or phenomenology.
Hypothesis 3
Contrary to expectations, the variation in items’ Rasch locations was smaller in the Non-
Delusional group (SD = .84 Logits) than the Delusional group (SD = 1.07 Logits).
However, this difference is not statistically significant (F (1,15) = 1.63, p > .10). Conse-
quently, we have no clear evidence of “clustering” or contagion-type effects in the
reported experiences for the Delusional vs Non-Delusional respondents. However, we
note that the Delusional group showed some “item clusters” positioned somewhat
lower in the Rasch hierarchy (“easier to endorse”), whereas most of the item-clusters in
the Non-Delusional group were at the extreme high end of the Rasch hierarchy (“more
difficult to endorse”). We offer no preferred explanation for this finding at this time, as
additional research is needed to clarify its validity and relevance.
Discussion
Most of the empirical patterns found here between self-reported occurrences of “ghostly
episodes” and “group-stalking” complement the conceptual parallels previously identified
by O’Keeffe et al. (2019). We argue that this cumulative evidence provides a reasonable
rationale for conceptualising some group-stalking accounts as ostensible incarnations of
encounter experiences – with corresponding endemic characteristics that are consistent
with the HP-S premise. Of course, Sheridan and James (2015) utilised close-ended ques-
tions about group-stalking victimisation, as opposed to free-response text. Future
studies might therefore base comparisons between group-stalking accounts and
ghostly episodes using free-response narratives or questions that allow more direct com-
parisons between themes. Nonetheless, our take on the present results offers important
theoretical and clinical insights.
Table 5. Correlations between the set of logit values between corresponding items in accounts of
group-stalking and ghostly episodes.
Group-stalking Spontaneous haunts Primed haunts Lifestyle haunts Fantasy haunts Illicit haunts
r .57 −.01 −.09 −.07 −.60
First, note that the most dominant classification system within the literature categorises
genuine stalking cases into five sub-types, i.e., rejected, intimacy-seeking, resentful, preda-
tory, and incompetent (Mullen et al., 2000). This triaxial system considers the context for
the stalking, stalker motivations and psychiatric status, and the prior stalker-victim
relationship. However, the group-stalking accounts from Sheridan and James (2015)
neither appear to fit easily within any of these categories, nor seem to differ from one
another in any meaningful ways pertinent to context, motivation, likely psychiatric state
of the stalkers, or the nature of the stalker-victim prior relationship. However, our proposed
syndrome model accounts for such remarkable similarity across the group-stalking
accounts, as compared to the diverse narratives from “non-delusional” stalking victims.
These trends further support the idea that group-stalking reflects a core phenomenon
versus a range of different categories of stalking behaviour.
Second, we suspect that the range of “signs or symptoms” putative victims experience
or report with group-stalking has been understudied and perhaps too restrictive. Sheridan
and James (2015) identified several major S/O events associated with group-stalking, but
we anticipate that self-reported victims will also endorse other, if not many, of the 32 dis-
crete S/O anomalies in Table 1 that characterise accounts of ghosts, poltergeists, and
haunted houses (cf. Houran et al., 2019). For example, Rasch scaling analyses (Houran &
Lange, 2001; Houran et al., 2019) indicate that ghostly episodes are partly defined by a
wide variety of S/O events. We likewise predict similar arrays of anomalous experiences
for putative victims of group-stalking.
Third, we hypothesise that group-stalking experients will exhibit perceptual or reason-
ing biases associated with magical thinking and delusion-like ideations (e.g., Houran &
Lange, 2004; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Irwin et al., 2012; Prike et al., 2018; Ross et al.,
2017; van Elk, 2015). For instance, Ross et al. (2017) explored the role of reasoning
biases in the formation of paranormal explanations of anomalous experiences. That
study built on research highlighting cognitive deficits associated with paranormal
beliefs (for a review, see Irwin, 2009), i.e., the adoption of implausible explanations for
anomalous experiences due to improper or biased consideration of evidence.
Ross et al. (2017) specifically argued that this result has implications for cognitive the-
ories of delusions. For instance, Lange and Houran’s (1998, 1999, 2000) model of subjective
paranormal belief and experience draws on attribution theory in the clinical literature (e.g.,
Jaspers, 1923/1963; Maher, 1988, 1992; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988), which explains delusions
as a byproduct of an individual’s failure to find a standard explanation for anomalous
experiences or ambiguous events. Other research challenges the adequacy of a “one-
factor” model of delusions and recommends a “two-factor” model (Coltheart et al.,
2011; Davies et al., 2001).
Two-factor proponents contend that the one-factor model is underspecified and that a
second factor—an impairment of the belief evaluation system—is required to explain the
process by which unusual (ambiguous or anomalous) experiences lead to delusional idea-
tions. These advocates propose that the “abducted inferences” generated in Maher’s
model only become delusional when the normal processes of belief evaluation are
impaired. Consistent with this two-factor model, Ross et al. (2017) found that individuals
low in “analytic cognitive style” (i.e., the willingness or disposition to critically evaluate
outputs from intuitive processing and engage in effortful analytic processing) were
more likely to invoke paranormal or esoteric labels for anomalous experiences.
Nevertheless, we would be remiss not to contrast group-stalking findings in the current
and previous work from some research examining haunt-type experiences alone. Contrary
to broader examinations of paranormal belief (e.g., Irwin, 2009), studies that specifically
examined ghostly episodes showed that participants, unlike the group-stalking data
used here, did not significantly differ in areas of cognitive impairment to those who
reported no haunt experiences (Laythe & Owen, 2012; Laythe et al., 2018). As such, one
primary difference from this sample compared to group-stalking samples is an apparent
lack of indicators for mental illness or pathological deficiencies in cognitive processing.
That said, self-reported haunt-experiences are linked to higher levels of transliminality
(e.g., Laythe et al., 2018; Ventola et al., 2019), which itself is a risk factor for various cogni-
tive and affective ailments (Evans et al., 2019).
Accordingly, exploring potential perceptual or reasoning biases and transliminality
levels in self-reported group-stalking victims, as well as other ostensible HP-S cases, is
an area ripe for future research. Other biological factors might also come into play in
these apparent delusional-type ideations. For instance, some evidence suggests that
asymmetric dopaminergic signalling (R > L), and not elevated dopaminergic signalling,
underlies psychosis neurochemistry in schizophrenia (see e.g., Bracha, 1989). Moreover,
future research efforts should also investigate the interpersonal or social psychological
variables likely involved in the genesis, interpretation, or maintenance of phenomena
within our HP-S rubric (Drinkwater et al., 2019; Hill et al., 2018, 2019). Here we acknowledge
that many delusional ideations or anomalous experiences are inherently private or solitary
experiences. Still, encounter experiences, epidemic hysteria, and group-stalking all seem
to possess an inherent quality that can be described as shareability (Annett et al., 2016)
or scalability (Hill et al., 2018, 2019).
Simply put, this entails a process of shared meaning-making or the social construction
of narratives. There have been extensive discussions on this general topic (e.g., Boothby
et al., 2014; Cooney et al., 2014; Rimé et al., 1991), but it appears to be understudied
and poorly understood in the context of delusion-like beliefs or anomalous ideations.
However, we assert that dedicated research in this area will inform a better understanding
of psychological “contagion”mechanisms that induce people to act as deliberate or unwit-
ting participants in anomalous or delusion-like episodes (see e.g., Bartholomew & Wessely,
2002; Boss, 1997; Cole et al., 1990; Derr & Persinger, 1989; Kerckhoff, 1982; Kerckhoff &
Back, 1965; Sirois, 1974; Wessely, 1987).
As such, we advocate continued studies of both ghostly episodes and group-stalking to
gain unique and ecologically valid insights about salient attentional, perceptual, and inter-
pretive processes operating here. For example, “cognitive attraction” and “social function”
help to facilitate the transmission of frequent collective rituals (Kaše et al., 2018). Likewise,
such variables perhaps also mediate expectancy effects, demand characteristics, or
“meme” behaviour in situations whereby in-group and out-group social dynamics can con-
tribute to esoteric beliefs and anomalous cognitions (see e.g., O’Mahony, 1978; Orne, 1962;
Slosson, 1899; Smith, 1992-1993; Wiseman et al., 2003).
Our premise that spontaneous “ghostly episodes” and “group-stalking” accounts share
a core experience is not above criticism: To be sure, despite several empirical similarities
demonstrated in this study, there remain some real or apparent differences or discrepan-
cies between these two anomalous experiences that should be explored and rectified.
Alternative to our HP-S framework, one possible explanation for the differences
between group-stalking and ghost-encounters might be found in the two-factor model of
delusions previously discussed but without making links between both experiences.
Assuming different types of delusions, it could be that there is a failure to find a standard
explanation for group-stalking experiences, and an impairment of the belief evaluation
system for “spontaneous” ghost encounters. Moreover, as both anomalous experiences
seemingly present a “schizotypal” way of decoding reality, ghost encounters might
relate more to positive schizotypy and group-stalking experiences more to negative schi-
zotypy (with its psychosocial morbidity). Many other ideas or alternative explanations cer-
tainly could be proffered.
Consequently, this paper is not the final word on the concept of HP-S or the potential
linkage between some subjective paranormal experiences and group-stalking accounts.
Arguably no single study or clinical model to date explains all the available data.
However, we hope our work motivates more sophisticated research designs that tackle
the similarities and differences presented here and explore new ideas that corroborate
or refute the HP-S concept. The potentially extreme dangers accompanying ideations of
group-stalking make it vitally important to understand the antecedents and correlates
of this phenomenon—whatever its ultimate etiology. Those dealing with group-stalking
claims in a professional capacity unfortunately have few resources to leverage at
present. However, our hypothesis that these reports are manifestations of the HP-S
concept recommends that clinical practitioners should take guidance initially from aca-
demic sources that explain how to contextualise and address “unexpected or troubling”
anomalous experiences using clinical, phenomenological, or transpersonal frameworks
(see e.g., Drinkwater et al., 2013; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Hastings, 1983; Murray, 2012;
Rabeyron & Loose, 2015).
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